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THE CRITICAL TRILEMMA.

THE great triangle of judgment concerning the Christ or, more strictly, the Jesus presents these mutually incompatible theses:

1. Jesus was Man and God,
2. Jesus was Man and not God,
3. Jesus was God and not Man.

The first is orthodox, the traditional view.¹ It calls for no discussion, it is not discussible; for it is the denial and renunciation of thought. No meaning can be attached to the compound God-Man. One may discourse about it forever, but can really form no idea and convey no idea that is intelligible or debatable. This thesis then belongs to the realm of faith, not of reason.

The second view is accepted with practical unanimity by the critical intelligence the world over. It makes no difference what kind of a man or how great a man one may take Jesus to have been, whether a miserable degenerate (with Binet-Sanglé), or a strange combination of contradictions (with Karl Weidel), or the synthesis of every conceivable excellence in the highest degree (with Vorwerk),—man is man and nothing more.

¹ Any one eager to enrich the language with sonorous vocables might find occasion in devising appropriate names for these three views. The first might be called dualistic or androtheistic; the second, liberal, historicistic, or andromonistic; the third, radical, symbolic, or theomonistic. The term allegorical does not seem so good as symbolic, and the adjective *mythic(al)* would be both misplaced and misleading. *Theomonistic* may be somewhat pedantic and outlandish, but it strikes nearest the bull's eye, for the most distinctive mark of the protochristian movement was its *militant monotheism*.

This view has met with such general acceptance among the "liberals" solely as a reaction from the orthodox dogma of Chalcedon, which they recognized as meaningless and impossible, and in supposed default of any choice, and not at all because of its inherent rationality or plausibility. The liberal critics rashly assumed that there was only one logical alternative, that the Jesus was surely either God-Man or mere man; on rejecting the first they felt forced to accept the second. Hence for a century the problem has been, How shall we understand and explain the New Testament and primitive Christianity on the hypothesis that Jesus was mere man? Immeasurable learning, indefatigable industry, inexhaustible patience, the keenest insight, the most piercing acumen, the most vivid imagination, the subtlest analysis, the boldest synthesis—all have been enlisted unceasingly and in every Christian country and in lavish extravagance in the persistent attempt to rationalize and make comprehensible the great facts of the New Testament and Protochristianity on the hypothesis of the pure-humanity of Jesus.

This splendid and heroic enterprise, though employing all the enginery of the human mind in its completest equipment, has issued in failure total, absolute, undeniable, and irremediable. Not one single feature of Protochristianity has been explained. No light whatever has been thrown upon the miracles, none upon the doctrines, none upon the early life. Neither has any *progress* been made towards any solution. The darkness is just as deep as ever, the diversities and contradictions among the critics become ever sharper and more numerous; there is not one that can satisfy himself much less any other, nor is there anywhere offered any outlook for improvement. The deepest researches of such as Reitzenstein, Norden, Charles, Reinach, Loisy, and Frazer in no way come to the support of

the liberal positions but at the very least necessitate complete re-formation of the lines of defence.

In the foregoing the language may sound a trifle strong, but it is not a whit too strong. It does not exaggerate the facts in the case. The bankruptcy of liberal criticism is as utter as such bankruptcy can be. It is not then too much to say that the situation as viewed from the second standpoint is hopeless. It must be repeated that when highly cultured and intelligent men tell us glibly and confidently that Jesus was merely a remarkable man, they do so simply and solely on the principle of the Excluded Middle, reasoning thus: He was either God-Man or pure man; but God-Man is impossible; therefore he was pure man. Convinced by such logic, they make no serious attempt to comprehend the New Testament and Protochristianity on their hypothesis, but merely feel confident that some way or other these phenomena *must* be comprehensible. Whereas, if they would make earnest effort to grasp the situation, they would soon discover that they were in a blind alley, that it was just as impossible to understand the historical and literary facts in terms of the pure-human Jesus as to understand the Jesus as at once both human and divine.

Such being the state of case, we are driven to inquire whether there be not another possibility, and instantly we discern a long neglected alternative: *Jesus was God.*

The full meaning of this statement is not easy to realize, still less easy to express in a narrow compass. It is not meant that Jesus was the metaphysical or cosmical God of Plato or Aristotle, of Zeno or Epicurus, still less the God of dogma, of Athanasius or Augustine or Thomas, or of Rome or London to-day. Nor again a mythical or astral or nature God, such as flourished in the many-named faiths of the circum-Mediterranean region. What is meant

is that Jesus was a certain person or aspect of deity, the aspect that recommended itself particularly to the religious mind of the Jewish Dispersion. Jesus was the Jehovah of the Hellenistic consciousness, of the Jewish consciousness as it was modified and profoundly modified by constant contact with the more or less nearly allied Greek consciousness in matters of religion. We might almost say that Jesus was Jehovah Hellenized. Of course, any such compact formula must sacrifice verity to brevity. In fact, this Hellenization could not run quite the same course in any two minds. The individual reaction necessarily varied from man to man. So Jesus could not mean quite the same for any two. The shades of conception varied like the colors of the spectrum, insensibly from one extreme to another. Yet there were certain resemblances and distinctions broad and clear enough to mark off certain groups with more or less clearness. An aspect or person of God was truly God and yet did not exhaust the idea of God; it was very God, and yet not all God.² Nothing like logical or metaphysical accuracy or consistency is to be expected in the deep musings of these Protochristians; on the contrary, we must expect to find all manner of contradictions, often patent, more often latent; we must expect to find them lying quietly side by side in our scriptures. Nor must we hope to find the divine and the human sundered completely in these early notions, any more than the material and the spiritual in early Greek philosophy.

It is not strange then that from the fusion of Jewish theologic-religious and Greek mythologic-philosophic thought there should have issued a compound or rather

²We have a similar case in the Bolzano-Dedekind-Cantor doctrine of infinity, where a part equals the whole, that is, may be set in one-one relation with the whole. Thus, of the infinite assemblage of integers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ..., $2n$, ... we may pick out the *even* integers, 2, 4, 6, 8, ..., $2n$, ... which form only a *part* of the original assemblage. Yet on taking out the factor 2 from these even integers we obtain the original assemblage 1, 2, 3, 4, ..., n , ..., $2n$, The part is equivalent or one-one related to the whole.

compounds, many-colored³ and many-shaped, a new deity or aspect of deity that itself presented varied aspects. Here the Greek, there the Jewish, tinge would be deepest, yonder they would vie in hue. For some the great concept of the Son of Man, present in Daniel, dominant in Enoch, would be most fascinating; they would frame their phrases in accord therewith.. Others might be more attracted by the suffering Servant of Yahveh, and would delineate an experience along the lines laid down in Isaiah lii. liii. They might easily extend the analogy to include the Alexandrian Wisdom and devise a career in which countless Old Testament phrases would be mirrored, saying, "(All) this was done that the scripture might be fulfilled," as in Matt. xxi. 4, where it is plain that the incident is a pure invention, to fulfil the scripture prophecy. Some again might sail on still loftier wing: they might dream of a second Adam, of a Man from heaven, of a new order of spiritual being ushered in by the new deity. Still others might remember the Stoic or the Philonic Logos and might conceive of him as Son of God, as an emanation from the inmost bosom of God conceived as the Father, an idea far older than either Philo or the Porch. Yet others might seize upon the genuine Jewish notion of the Messiah, the Christ, and sublime it into the concept of the vicegerent of God, the envoy extraordinary, the ambassador plenipotentiary of the court of heaven unto all the nations of the earth. Indeed, there seems to be no limit to the divagations of religious and theosophic fancy when once set free to roam at will in such airy realms. To any one who properly estimates the mythopoetic faculty and its enormous importance in the history of civilization, none of the foregoing need seem remarkable, but in any case it was certainly all actual, for exactly those ideas and countless

³ πολυποικίλος, Eph. iii. 10.

others more or less similar are indubitably present in the New Testament and other early Christian literature.

But in all of this diapason there is one ground-tone that sounds out clearer than any other. It is the great note of *salvation*. Above all else the new deity is the *Saviour*. For this the pure Greek⁴ is used in the New Testament only 24 times: 8 times it is "God (the) Saviour" or "Saviour God"; twice it is "Our God and Saviour Jesus Christ (or Christ Jesus)"; 4 times (in 2 Peter) it is "Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ"; twice it is "Saviour of the world" (John iv. 42; 1 John iv. 14); thrice (Titus i. 4; iii. 6; 2 Tim. i. 10) it is "our Saviour"; five times it is "Saviour." It belongs to the later strata of composition (Johannines, Pastorals, 2 Peter, Jude), elsewhere only in Luke i. 47; ii. 11; Acts v. 31; xiii. 23; Eph. v. 23; Phil. iii. 20. A favorite with the Gnostics, it lost caste with the orthodox, who substituted "Lord." But instead of this pure Greek, that smacked maybe too much of paganism, the New Testament puts Jesus and preferably The Jesus. This was *understood* to mean *Saviour*, as is clear from Matt. i. 21, "And thou shalt call his name Jesus, for it is he that *shall save*⁵ his people from their sins." Justin Martyr and Epiphanius both interpret the name as *Saviour*; that their etymology was not quite correct makes no difference, the question is not what the name really meant (Yah-help) a thousand years B. C., but what it was *thought* to mean in the first century A. D. (or B. C.), and that was *Saviour*.

The salvation was from sin or sins. The chief sin, which dragged all others in its train, was idolatry. The chief mission of the "Saviour of the world" was to save it from idolatry, from false worship of false gods. Such was almost necessarily the central idea of a new mono-

⁴ σωτήρ.

⁵ σώσει.

theism in the midst of polytheism. This great controlling idea is expressed beautifully under a host of symbols in the Gospels. The world to be saved, mainly Gentiles, but partly Jewish or half-Jewish, is represented as a human being suffering from some form of disease or affliction, as sick or halt or blind or leprous or even dead, and to this wretch the Saviour-God, the Jesus, brings healing. A still more favorite image depicts the polytheistic world as a man possessed of demons (the gods of heathendom), or more pathetically as a fallen woman (an unchaste woman being the regular Old Testament term for an idolatrous people); the Saviour-God, the Jesus, expels the demons, forgives the sins of the woman, who worships him (i. e., who is converted to monotheism, to the Jesus-cult).

Beyond this framework of ideas the earliest Gospel (in all probability) did not extend. The scene is lead in Galilee of the Gentiles, to represent the rising on benighted heathendom of the great light, of the proclamation of salvation, of the Saviour-God, the Jesus, that is, the preaching of "the monotheistic Jesus-cult" (Deissmann), of the worship of the One God under the aspect of Saviour (from sin, i. e., from idolatry). But at an early date there was made a most important addition: Some imported from their own abandoned heathen cult the notion of a "dying God," of a god that saved his people by dying for them, a notion derived originally from nature-worship or from the sacrifice of the king to preserve the vigor of kingship, but held very tenaciously by many even after conversion from polytheism, even as our Germanic ancestors still clung to their heathen notions long after conversion to Christianity. What more natural than to engraft this pagan notion on the primitive Gospel, which was especially easy to do, since the suffering Servant of Yahveh is represented (Is. liii.

12), as "pouring out his soul (Septuagint, 'was delivered') unto death."

The especial form that this representation should take may have been given by an expression in Heb. vi. 6,⁶ where it reads like a quotation, "crucifying to themselves the Son of God and putting him to an open shame." The phrase is used of such as at first accept the doctrine of the Christ⁷ but fail to go on with it, falling by the wayside and bringing the doctrine into contempt and disrepute: the word *crucifying*⁸ seems nearly equivalent to *pillorying*. That the word is used figuratively seems indicated by the phrase "putting to open shame."⁹ The only conceivable way in which this could be done was by rejecting the doctrine of the Son of God, and since actual crucifixion is out of the question, and since the two participles seem quite parallel, we must assume that their meanings are nearly the same. Even though there be no adducible case of *crucify*¹⁰ used in the sense of *pillory*, yet we know that the cross was the punishment of slaves and miscreants, that it was considered peculiarly ignominious, so that it could hardly escape becoming a symbol of shame and disgrace (Heb. xii. 2). Such a sense seems demanded by the context in this passage. If now such be the case, then we may easily see how from this germ may have sprung up the whole story of the crucifixion. The Jews of Jerusalem, who rejected the doctrine of the Jesus and may even have tried to repress it, are most vividly and dramatically represented as arresting, trying, condemning the Son of God, the Jesus, and then calling on the Roman government to carry

⁶ Hereby it is not at all excluded, what is emphasized in *Ecce Deus*, that the famous impalement of the righteous one (in Plato's Republic, II, 361D) may have suggested the idea of the crucifixion of Jesus; but the part of the Jews and of Jerusalem must have been derived from elsewhere.

⁷ τὸν . . . τοῦ Χριστοῦ λόγον, Heb. vi. 1.

⁸ ἀνασταυροῦντας.

⁹ παραδειγματίζοντας, making *him* a public example.

¹⁰ ἀνασταυροῦνται.

out their verdict, which they themselves could not legally do.

Now it is well known that the whole account swarms with improbabilities. Such a hasty proceeding at such a time appears credible only when all things are possible. This matter has been set forth so repeatedly and conclusively that it would seem needless to dwell on it here. There is in the whole story not a single feature of likelihood. Even Brandt, who does not question the traditional view, in his learned *Evangelische Geschichts* is compelled to reject the major portion as palpable fiction, and the remaining fraction he retains for the most insufficient of reasons, because not in itself unbelievable nor showing any obvious tendency. If indeed the central fact of the crucifixion were itself independently well assured (as Brandt would naturally assume in 1893, but by no means now), then such reasons might be admitted, in the absence of counter-reasons. But since now the focal figure of Jesus can not be proved to be historical (as conceded by representative historicists themselves), the hypothesis of the historicity becomes needless, being no longer necessary. We must in accord with Occam's law of parsimony explain as many as possible of the details of the Last Days in some such way as Brandt (among others) has so successfully employed on the majority; nor does it appear that there is any single feature that *may* not thus be explained.

All the more confidently do we go at this work, since it is now coming into clearer and clearer evidence and is admitted by such authorities as Harnack that the "Sayings," the Q-source, the oldest form yet known of the Gospel, did *not* contain any such account as we now read of the Judean ministry or the presence of Jesus in Jerusalem, but was confined to Galilee. It calls for the utmost zeal and for almost superhuman ingenuity to reconcile such a fact with the historical authenticity of the Passion

week and its central feature, the crucifixion. On the other hand, we have now a thoroughly satisfactory explanation in terms of motives, methods, and materials, all of which are known independently to be not only real but also favorites with the men of that time and place.

It is a very strong confirmation of this interpretation of the Passion-week, particularly the crucifixion, as a symbolic-dramatic homily on the Jewish rejection of the Jesus cult, that it is the motifs of shame, of ignominy, of mockery, and of Jewish unbelief and contempt that are plainly conspicuous, and by no means any motifs drawn from Jesus himself, whether his power, his love, or his suffering. These latter contribute little or nought to the representation, whereas even the old festival of the Sacæa at Babylon is made to contribute to the picture of the shame and ignominy to which the king is subjected. It has been argued that the details of the soldiers' mockery (about which the disciples could have known nothing, but which are narrated in the same spirit as all the rest) must be historical, because so closely resembling the Sacæan! Whereas it is obvious that the latter merely furnish the model for the fictive imagination of the Evangelist. Similar relations abound in history.

To the foregoing it remains only to add that the supremely important incident of the resurrection is now admitted in all critical quarters to be unhistorical. The liberal rejects decisively the notion that his mere man Jesus rose up from the dead or was in any way resuscitated. The liberal concerns himself not for an instant with the question, How did Christ rise from the dead? (which he denies *in toto*), and vexes himself solely with the purely psychological question, How did the disciples *come to believe* that Jesus rose from the dead? This question alone has for liberals any rationality. They seek solely to explain the amazing mistake of the disciples, from Magde-

lena and Peter down to Saul of Tarsus. In this quest of an explanation for such an era-making delusion they have squandered the most splendid abilities, all absolutely to no purpose whatever, except to make more and more indisputably evident that all such efforts are idle and that no such explanation is possible. At this point the victory of the orthodox over the liberal critic is complete and certain. It is folly in any one to reject the physical miracle of resurrection as incredible and then to accept the psychical miracle of the universal belief in that resurrection as convincingly attested; for the belief is just as incomprehensible as the thing believed. To convince oneself of the hopelessness of the task of making the belief in the resurrection intelligible, it suffices to read carefully the theories of the greatest masters, the biographers of Jesus, such as Keim and Volkmar, Holtzmann and Pfeiderer, Renan and Reville, and even Loisy and Holsten. The keener the critic's intellect, the absurd his theory.

On the other hand, the radical criticism offers a solution in perfect harmony with all the ascertained facts in the case and of a piece with the general body of symbolic interpretation that is demanded for understanding the Gospel, as well as in accord with modes of speech current in evangelic circles. This solution is set forth in *Der vorchristliche Jesus*, in the essay entitled "Anastasis." Though not yet accessible in English, it cannot be reproduced here even in substance, it must suffice to indicate the barest outline: The doctrine of the resurrection was not at first stated in the word *Anastasis*, but almost certainly (as in Acts) in some such form as "God hath raised up Jesus." It is unlikely that the primitive preacher meant "resuscitated" or "revived" by the term "raised up." Other words were at hand, which he would have used more naturally. On the contrary, the term "raised up" in both of its Greek

forms¹¹ as well as in its Hebrew equivalent (*qûm*)¹² was regularly used to denote—not resuscitation, far from it, but—establishment, appointment, installation; in fact, *anastasis* is literally *up-setting* and it is commonly used exactly in this sense of overthrow,¹³ but also in the exactly opposite sense of *setting-up*, establishing (as in Luke ii. 34), erecting (as of walls, trophies, images, etc.). It is only in this latter sense that the verb is used in the New Testament, and though the raising-up *might* be “from the dead,” yet this latter phrase is not needed and is sometimes positively excluded. If we would discover what the first preachers would have meant and what the first hearers would have understood by the words “God hath raised up Jesus,” we can not do better than to turn to the Old Testament and particularly to the Septuagint translation. Here we find that ‘UR¹⁴ is used four times of “raising up” a man, as “the righteous” (Is. xli. 2), “him from the north” (Is. xli. 25), “him in righteousness” (Is. xlvi. 13), rendered by *egeirō* thrice, by *exegeirō* once; that *qûm* is used most frequently in the same sense and is rendered by *anistēmi*, more seldom *egeirō*, thus: “God will raise up a prophet” (Deut. xviii. 15, 18); “Yahveh raised up judges” (Judg. ii. 16, 18); “Yahveh raised up a Saviour” (Judg. iii. 9, 15); “Yahveh will raise up a king” (1 Kings xiv. 14, Jer. xxx. 9); “I will raise David a righteous branch” (Messiah) (Jer. xxiii. 5); “I will raise up for them a plant” (Ez. xxxiv. 29); “I will raise up a shepherd” (Zech. xi. 16), and especially “The man raised up for Messiah of God of Jacob” (2 Sam. xxiii. 1, Sept. “whom the Lord raised up for Christ of God of Jacob”). Here be it noted the very words of the Christian dogma are used. In Acts

¹¹ ἀνέστησεν and ἤγειρεν.

¹² בָּקַר

¹³ So in Herod. I, 177, 178 ἀνάστατα and ἀναστάτον mean “subjected,” “overthrown.”

¹⁴ רִאשׁוֹן

ii. 24 Peter says “whom God raised up,”¹⁵ a clear echo of the Septuagint, “whom the Lord raised up.”¹⁶ Now let us ask the “unbiased man,” to whom the historicists are so fond of appealing, when Peter first quoted the words used of the establishment of “David Son of Jesse,” is it likely that he used them with the same or with a wholly different meaning? And even if the latter, is it likely that his *hearers understood* them in the familiar or in a wholly unfamiliar sense? Consider also that in Acts ii. 30 we *must* refer this *raising-up* to the establishment on the throne of David. For it is declared, “therefore (David) being a prophet and knowing that with an oath God had sworn to him from the fruit of his loins to seat (one) on his throne, foreseeing spake of the *anastasis* of the Christ.” If by *anastasis* here be meant the establishment of the Christ (on the throne of David), then all is in order, Peter is speaking rationally and is intelligible to his auditors; but if resurrection be meant, then the logic fails and becomes hard or impossible for the hearer to understand. What sense in saying that David, knowing God had promised to establish a lineal successor on his throne, foreseeing (the fulfilment) spake of the resurrection of the Christ? The following clause tries to explain this by misquoting Ps. xvi. 10. The Psalm says naught about flesh or corruption, even the Septuagint says not “flesh” but “thy holy one,” as does the Hebrew. Such a misquotation seems plainly an after-thought of the Christian compiler, and no part of the earliest propaganda. Peter would have been called to order had he begun his preaching by such gross miscitation. In Acts xiii. 35 a similar misconstruction is attributed to Paul, but since the redaction of Acts falls near the close of the first century, there is no reason to hold Paul responsible; it is far more likely that it is the work of a reviser or compiler, nor is there any ground to

¹⁵ οὐ δὲ θεὸς ἀνέστησεν.

¹⁶ οὐ ἀνέστησε κύριος.

affirm with Kautzsch that this "Scripture proof" (at least in this form) "formed part of the oldest Gospel preaching" (*Die heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments*, II, 123).

The next verse (Acts ii. 32) states merely, "This Jesus hath God raised up," and verse 36, "Surely then let all the house of Israel know that God hath made him both Lord and Christ." The following words, "this Jesus, whom ye crucified," are unnecessary and sound very like an interpolation. That the interpolator has been busy here is known and admitted. Even Von Soden brackets the six words *to kata sarka anastēsein ton Christon* (verse 30). The splendid verse 33, "By the right hand therefore of God raised up on high etc.," can not refer to any resuscitation, but must refer to the installation of Jesus as pro-Jehovah. Turning now to the similar discourse in Acts iii, we find our contentions greatly strengthened. In verse 22 the prediction of Moses is quoted, that "a prophet shall our Lord God raise up"¹⁷ for you," and in verse 26 the *fulfilment* is found in the fact that "unto you first God, having raised up his Servant,¹⁸ has sent him to bless you etc." Common sense would demand that *raise up* means as nearly as possible the same in both verses; and it seems very hard to endure such a rendering as "God having resuscitated his Servant has sent him"; whereas the notion of the establishment of Jesus satisfies all requirements—the sending of Jesus is then obviously the proclamation of his cult.

It is true that verses 13^b-15 refer plainly to the crucifixion, but these verses may fairly be taken to represent a later revision of the oration, indeed they *must* be so taken, if the whole situation is to be made intelligible: that Peter should have preached and convinced thousands that a man lame from birth had been made whole by the name of Jesus who had been crucified six weeks before as a malefactor, is incredible. Jesus appears before us as a God,

¹⁷ ἀναστήσει.

¹⁸ ἀναστήσας τὸν παιδα.

the viceroy of God most High, and the story of the Passion is just as much a later addition here as it is (by admission of such a staunch historicist as Harnack) in the Gospels.

On passing to Stephen's speech we find new confirmation. In Acts vii. 37 the same prediction of the *raising up* is cited, where there is certainly no hint of resuscitation. Coming now to the great speech ascribed to St. Paul at Pisidian Antioch (Acts xiii. 17-41) we find in verse 22 that God "raised up"¹⁹ David as King," in verse 23 we read that God "raised up"¹⁹ for Israel a Saviour Jesus, John having forepreached before face of his entrance etc." Here there is surely no reference to resuscitation but only to the introduction of the Jesus.²⁰ It is true that many very old MSS. read "led"²¹ instead of "raised up,"²² and this reading is preferred by the editors; but it is enough for our purposes that many old and high authorities read "raised up" as given above. In verses 32, 33 it is again stated that God had fulfilled the promise to the fathers by "raising up"²³ Jesus," where the sense of establishment is necessary, and of resuscitation impossible; for it is the Ps. ii. 7 that is quoted as fulfilled, "Thou art my Son, I this day have begotten thee," where the reference is certainly to installation. True there follows straightway (verse 34) an attempted proof that "he raised him from the dead," but this seems to be an after-thought, and may surely be understood easily as the work of the reviser.

This reviser here uses *anestēsen* because he is trying to explain the *anastēsas* of verse 33; everywhere else he uses the term which means "rouse up" rather than "raise

¹⁹ ἤγειρεν.

²⁰ Verses 27-31 refer to the Passion, but are clearly marked as a later insertion: verse 26 connects naturally not with verse 27 but with verse 32, with which verse 31 does not connect naturally. Leave out these verses, and see how much more smoothly it reads. That the interpolator has been busy here is certain, for in verse 29 some excellent ancient manuscripts contain an important addition of ten words.

²¹ ἤγαγεν.

²² ἤγειρεν.

²³ ἀναστήσας.

up,"²⁴ as in Acts iii. 15; v. 30; x. 40; xiii. 30, 37; xxvi. 8. This use was very natural, for though "rouse up" may be used of inauguration and is so used in the Septuagint (as we have seen) and also in Acts xiii. 22, 23, yet its idea lies closer to "resuscitation" than does that of "raise up." In the Epistles it is everywhere *egeirō*, never *anistēmi*, though the middle form, "rise up"²⁵ is used oftentimes in allusion to the dead (Eph. v. 14; 1 Thess. iv, 14, 16).

In Ephesians it is the spiritually dead, in Thessalonians the writer seems to refer (verse 14) to a dogma rather than to an historical fact. In Heb. vii. 11, 15 the reference is certainly not to resuscitation but to the rising-up or appointment of the great "High Priest after the order of Melchizedec," i. e., to the inauguration of the new deity or his cult.

It seems clear then that the phrase "raised up Jesus" originally referred to the historic installation of the new God, Jesus, or what is nearly the same, to the introduction of his cult, and the word *anistēmi* was preferred, in its regular Septuagint sense. Gradually, as the doctrine of the "dying God" pleased more and more the Gentile converts, as the Passion week intruded into the primitive Gospel, the application of the phrase was diverted to the resuscitation of the Crucified, and the verb "raise up"²⁶ was either explained to mean resuscitate or was displaced by "rouse up,"²⁷ which more naturally suggested revival. A strong witness to this process is found in Matt. xxvii. 53 (admittedly a very late passage), where the term *egersis* is used, instead of the regular word *anastasis*, to denote resurrection. In *Der vorchristliche Jesus* (pp. 228-232) it is shown that the phrase "from the dead"²⁸ seems to have come in gradually, in many places by interpolation.

Such appears to have been the original sense of the phrase "raised up Jesus," and such its gradual, though

²⁴ ἐγέλπω.

²⁵ ἀναστάματι.

²⁶ ἀναστῆμι.

²⁷ ἐγέλπω.

²⁸ ἐκ νεκρῶν.

very early, transformation of meaning. Somewhat similar changes abound in the histories of cults and religions, where they shine clear to the eye of the modern student, though less evidenced than the one in hand. Surely no one can maintain that such a process is impossible, certainly no one has tried to show any improbability in the foregoing conception. Pfeiderer did indeed pronounce it "perverse" (*verkehrt*), but without the display of reasons. Critics have in general avoided it, though some have admitted in print that the essay on *Anastasis* was particularly hard to refute, and an illustrious Biblicalist has (in a private letter) declared it the strongest of all contentions in *Der vorchristliche Jesus*, and on its face impregnable. In the presence of the admitted failure of all other attempts to understand the faith and dogma of the resurrection, this one would seem to call for consideration. The single obvious objection would appear to be that it presupposes extensive revision and modification of the primitive forms of the New Testament writings, or at least of the original doctrines and documents that have been worked up in our present canonical scriptures; but he who is unwilling to proceed on this hypothesis may as well abandon once for all the problem of New Testament interpretation; for outside of it there is no hope whatever of understanding even the most obvious facts.

It may now be in place to give in conclusion a general though partial conspectus of the critical situation. The necessity of some other theory of Christian origins than the prevailing historicistic theory, is shown in the following:

1. This latter theory is not now and never was plausible in itself; it is not guaranteed by any precedent or succedent in history; the supposed situation is extremely unlike any other presented in human experience, and the course of events is without any parallel in the annals of men; it is in fact quite unique, an incomparable exception.

2. The attempt to interpret Jesus as a mere man is only a first and natural reaction from the impossible conception of the God-Man and has little else to recommend it than that its only recognized alternative is unthinkable. As soon as the third possibility, Jesus was God (under a particular aspect or person), is distinctly recognized, the liberal view is at once stripped of all its fictitious necessity and even probability.

3. The complete failure of all attempts to discover an historical Jesus is clearly and convincingly set forth (in Schweitzer's "Quest of the Historical Jesus") by a very high authority in the very center of the liberal camp. One may agree or disagree with Schweitzer at a multitude of points, but it is impossible to shut one's eyes to the broad general fact that no progress has been made towards clearing up primitive Christianity regarded as an emanation from a personal focus, Jesus. Indeed, the most venerated oracles of criticism are coming to recognize this quest as hopeless. Loisy, while still cherishing the simulacrum of an historical Jesus, admits definitely that "it is not to the Gospel of Jesus, it is to the Christian mystery that the Greco-Roman world was converted." Similarly Söderblom in his new edition of Tiele's *Kompendium der Religionsgeschichte*. Not strange then that Kennedy complains that it is now held that "the mystery of Paul's conversion is his conversion to the mysteries." Unmistakably the humanity of Jesus is fast losing all significance for primitive Christianity, even in the hands of its stanchest defenders; it is becoming, in Ransom's fine phrase (in his review of *Ecce Deus*) "an utterly ineffectual source of Christian influence." While such critics fight furiously for the husk, they let the kernel disappear forever.

4. The historicistic view fails wholly to yield us any intelligible or even admirable, much less lovable or adorable, character of Jesus. This fact is brought most clearly to

light in such a penetrating and sympathetic study as Weidel's on the *Persönlichkeit Jesu*. Weidel finds himself compelled to throw overboard all current conceptions of Jesus's character, yea, to reverse them at nearly every point. He is *forced* to think of Jesus as essentially choleric, wrathful, harsh, and even unjust in judgment; almost every trace of warmer and tenderer humanity vanishes, and there remains a character not unlike Fichte's in its moral fanaticism, only greatly exaggerated and narrow, and, what is even more significant, shot through and through every way with violent contradictions. These indeed Weidel not only exhibits but tries to reconcile, though with pitiful success. His painstaking and conscientious study leaves us with an incomprehensible medley of contraries instead of a character, and the appeal to Goethe as a parallel is merely bewildering. Weidel himself confesses the extreme difficulty of the situation, but thinks it *must* be overcome unless the peculiarities of the Gospel can be explained as mainly literary phenomena. Herein he is greatly right. The impressiveness of the Gospel portrait is essentially a matter of vivid rhetoric, and finds its explanation in the collective and contagious enthusiasm of a circle formed of many smaller circles of militant monotheists. This rare literary flavor may well be derived in a large measure from one or more specially gifted members whose names we know as little as we know the names of the authors of the 23d, the 90th, the 139th Psalm, or of a hundred others who have studded the firmament of religious literature with unquenchable constellations. The radical view does not deny nor deprecate the large contributions of personality and personalities to the protochristian movement, on the contrary it recognizes them in the amplest measure; but no one of these personalities was the God Jesus of primitive Christianity: they were all servants of the Heavenly Master.

5. The historicistic view fails utterly to present any comprehensible picture of the activity of the Jesus, of his agency as it existed in the minds of the earliest New Testament writers. This fact comes clearly to light in such "a sufficient answer to its recent critics" as Bacon's *Christianity Old and New*. This master of exegesis recognizes three different types of "characterization of Jesus" as found in the New Testament: Paul's, Mark's, Q's. Each of these he perceives is "conventionalized": Paul's after the concept of the "Servant of God" (in the later Isaiah); Mark's "wholly different conception" "contains scarcely a trace of the Isaian conception," never predicates humility, forbearance, long-suffering, exhibits "heroism, virility, and power," "a superhuman authority," "already at the right hand of God," "more of defiance than humility"; the Q-conception (that of the "Sayings") presents Jesus as "the Servant of God who is the incarnation of his redeeming spirit of wisdom," following the "conventional ideal" of "the Alexandrian Wisdom literature." In particular, Bacon recognizes the famous "Come unto me etc." (Matt. xi. 25-30) as a "Hymn of Wisdom," referring to Norden's "Agnostos Theos" (1913). It was distinctly declared to be such in *Ecce Deus*, pp. 165-166.

It goes without saying that three such "wholly different" conceptions, conventionalized, discrepant, and without any support in any well attested words or deeds, can afford no firm historic basis for any understanding of the Jesus. Bacon in fact admits that "little indeed should we know of Jesus as he was, but for the Gospel of Mark," and yet Mark presents him (as already set forth in *Ecce Deus*) without any attractive qualities, in truth without human characteristics,—to quote Bacon— as "the Christ the Son of God," as an "authority," "in heroic proportions," whose "mighty works" are in "the foreground," "whose 'words of grace' . . . have almost disappeared."

Bacon confesses (p. 158), "the contrast between this conception and that of Paul could hardly be stronger within the limits of fidelity to historic fact." The closing phrase is evidently thrown in merely *pro domo*. According to Bacon's own statement it is superfluously manifest that these three conceptions (and he might have added a fourth, the Johannine) have no perceptible relation to historic fact, they are pure products of idealizing fancy, determined in form and contents by the temperaments of the writers and the *milieu* in which they were engendered.

As Wrede has most clearly shown, especially in treating Mark, and as Bacon knows excellently well, there is displayed nowhere in the Gospels any sense of "the limits of historic fact." It is plain in nearly every paragraph that the writers are trying to express ideas, and that they are using the incidents merely as a means of such expression, and hence the incidents are entirely plastic in their hands. This is generally admitted in critical circles concerning three-fourths, or even nine-tenths, or still more, of the total; of the small residue, where the *tendance*, the formative action of dogmatic interest, is not so clearly discernible, it is only our ignorance (of the original circumstances of the case) that is responsible. In no case has any alleged biographic datum been shown even probably to be really such; the "Pillars of Schmiedel" sleep in the dust. It is queer reasoning that, when the great bulk (which we do understand) is admittedly tendential and unhistorical, therefore the small remainder (which we do not yet understand) is naive and biographical! Such thinking goes directly against the chief methodological maxim, the Law of Parsimony, the Razor of Occam.

6. The historicistic view fails to explain the transference of the propaganda from Galilee to Judea and the disappearance of Galilee from the subsequent history of the movement. This consideration has been set forth in *Ecce*

Deus (pp. 170-175) and appears to be decisive. No reply seems to have been attempted.

7. The historicistic view fails to account for the world-mission of the new religion. Harnack admits that it did not start from any historic Jesus, whose precept and practice (he thinks) were all against it. But this world-mission was the very heart of Protochristianity; to concede that it did not issue from any historic Jesus is to concede that he was not the source of primitive Christianity.

8. The historicistic theory can not explain the sudden wide-spread outburst of the propaganda, its apparently multifocal origin. This consideration has been enforced in *Der vorchristliche Jesus* (pp. 23-31), and though it has deeply impressed German reviewers, no attempt has been made to answer it—the trivial cavil of Weinel was most easily annulled.

9. The historicistic theory fails to explain the relation of Paul to (any historic) Jesus, nor can it make Paul himself or the Pauline preaching intelligible. The latest and most ingenious essays on “Paul and Jesus” satisfy only their authors, while more and more the explanation of Paulinism is sought in the mystery-religions with which it has so many apparent points of contact.

10. The historicistic construction wrecks utterly on the fact that it postulates an amazing personality in Jesus, a personality of astounding energy, ardor, enthusiasm, magnetism, and of the most restless activity, a personality that dominated all within its circle during life and still more after death—yet left not the slightest ripple in the course of events, is never mentioned in contemporaneous history, nor in any accounts independent of the early Christian! What is still more confounding, this impressive human personality disappears entirely and instantly from the earliest Christian preaching, which knows nothing of Jesus save as an over-earthly being, as a God. The references

to Jesus are of course frequent enough, but they are dogmatic and do not tell us certainly one single thing about his humanity, not one word that he uttered, not one deed that he did. This argument has been urged in *Ecce Deus* (pp. 18-25), it has deeply impressed such critics as Meyboom (*Theol. Tijdsch.*, 1912, p. 44), and it calls urgently for answer,—but none has been attempted.

11. The historicist hypothesis fails to explain the New Testament, more especially the symbolic element in the Gospels. That there is such an element, that it is extensive and important, and that it urgently demands honest, serious, and thorough-going consideration—all this is entirely beyond question. So much is indeed admitted by German authorities, such as Dibelius and Brückner. The obvious symbolisms discussed in *Ecce Deus* may be much increased in number. Sooner or later, criticism must make its peace with these momentous facts, and that will be the end of historicism.

12. The historicist theory can not explain extra-canonical old Christian literature; in particular, it can not explain the apologist, nor the *Teaching*, nor the *Shepherd* (of Hermas), especially the ominous silence of these latter as to any historical Jesus, their apparent utter ignorance of the whole New Testament story. The apologists have been treated (of course, not exhaustively) in *Ecce Deus*; the *Teaching* and the *Shepherd* are the subjects of elaborate essays ready for print. The argument from old Christian literature is conclusive; no attempt has been made to answer.

From the foregoing summary many most important considerations have been omitted, as too subtle or linguistic, or defying condensed statement. It remains to add that the symbolistic or radical theory is strong wherever its opponent is weak, that it has explained thus far every well-ascertained fact in the whole case, that in the happy

simile of the review of *Ecce Deus* in the *Christian Commonwealth* of London, "it fits in the New Testament as a key fits in the wards of its lock." It will doubtless receive enlargement and modification at the hands of such as Norden, Reitzenstein, Wendland, Hertlein, and other philologists, but its elements of truth are too obvious even for prejudice permanently to ignore. At no point thus far has it been successfully assailed (see "Leben Jesu, Kritik," *Theol. Jahresb.*, 1912-1913, pp. 239-252).

Meantime such scholars as Conybeare and his fellows may amuse themselves with "merciless criticisms" of the astro-mythologic interpretations of Robertson, Fuhrmann, Niemojewski, Jensen, Morosow, and with other irrelevancies. If some of these interpretations should maintain themselves, it would be highly interesting and even instructive; if one and all they should collapse like bubbles, no harm would be done, the radical symbolistic theory would not be in the least affected; for it depends upon such astro-mythology only as the tree depends upon the vine, or the wall upon the ivy.

WILLIAM BENJAMIN SMITH.

TULANE UNIVERSITY, NEW ORLEANS.